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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017
TAGS: [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [KNNP](#) [UNSC](#) [SY](#) [RU](#) [IR](#) [IS](#)
SUBJECT: IRAN: ISRAELI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ON UNSCR
1737 IMPLEMENTATION

REF: A. STATE 24344

[1](#)B. STATE 23001

Classified By: CDA Gene A. Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

[1](#)1. (S) Responding to the points in reftels, Merav Zafary and Gil Reich from the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff February 28 that they were timely -- coming in advance of the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) meeting set for March 5 -- and hopefully will encourage other countries to consider what they are doing to implement UNSCR 1737. Observing that U.S. action to date has been based on existing legislation (e.g., the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act), Zafary wondered if other countries are already crafting legislation so that they can implement UNSCR 1737's requirements.

[1](#)2. (S) Reich expressed his view that the points in ref A hit all the main areas of concern regarding what remains unknown about Iran's nuclear program, but wondered if it might be worthwhile to mention at some point in the future Iran's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors/investigators to meet and talk with high-level Iranian MOD officials. He suggested that Iran's refusal to date points to the Iranian military's possible involvement in Iran's nuclear program for military purposes, as well as in the role of executor of a clandestine program. Iran's refusal -- combined with the results of particle analysis of enriched uranium found on machinery at an Iranian military complex in Lavizan -- yield what Reich portrayed as a weighty body of indicators that Iran's military is playing a lead role in a clandestine nuclear program.

[1](#)3. (S) Reich noted that Israel's Ambassador to Vienna has also been instructed to look into the language of IAEA DG El-Baradei's latest report on Iran as it refers to the establishment of "hot cells" at Iran's Arak nuclear research reactor. Reich explained that hot cells -- when properly configured -- can be used to separate spent fuel from reactors for re-processing to create plutonium. While Reich acknowledged that there are legitimate reasons for the Iranians to set up hot cells at Arak (e.g., for isotope separation), he stressed nevertheless that more attention should be directed to this. Certain manipulators and glass shielding at the hot cells should yield some indication of their ultimate use. Reich noted that in 2003, the French notified other Nuclear Suppliers Group members confidentially that they had received from an Iranian company a request for equipment that could be used in Iranian hot cells for plutonium separation. Reich said that he would welcome any thoughts the U.S. would be able to share on this approach,

and noted that he will be in Vienna next week to follow-up on discussions he held with USG officials last summer on bilateral cooperation in other areas.

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